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Early theorists predicted that women would bear the brunt of the transition from
central planning to mixed market economies in East Central Europe (ECE) and the
former Soviet States [Fong and Paull, 1993; Sziraczki and Windell, 1992; Einhorn,
1993]. It was expected that liberalizing the centrally determined wages would in-
crease inequality between men and women. Dismantling the system of extensive so-
cial benefits established to promote equality and encourage female labor force partici-
pation coupled with the privatization of childcare would increase the costs of partici-
pating in the labor market. Furthermore, labor shedding was expected to hit indus-
tries with a  high concentration of female workers first and hardest, leading to high
unemployment rates among women.
Evidence from the early transition, however, suggests that women in some
transitioning economies have actually improved their economic position relative to
men despite rising overall earnings inequality throughout the region [Rutkowski,
1996]. In 1986 the average female worker in Bulgaria earned about 74 percent as
much per month as the average male worker. By 1993, the monthly earnings differ-
ential between men and women decreased by almost six percent.
The goal of this essay is to account for the decline in the gender earnings gap in
Bulgaria’s early transition within the broader context of the wage structure changes
documented in transitioning economies. In particular, the analysis distinguishes be-
tween the portion of the decreased gender earnings gap caused by “group-specific”
factors from the component caused by changes in the structure of wages, where “group-
specific” factors represent the degree to which differences in skills between men and
women or group differences in industry participation contribute to the decline in the
earnings gap. “Wage-structure” factors describe the institutional context in which
wages are determined and consist of the portion of the gap explained by changes in
skill prices (such as returns to education or returns to working in a particular indus-
try) and changes in the overall level of inequality in an economy.
The empirical research relies on cross-sectional survey data from 1986 and 1993.
This allows for a comparison between pre- and early-transition Bulgaria, because the
initial measures of the economic reform were implemented in 1991 when prices and
wages were liberalized. The 1986 survey is the only existing pre-transition survey
from Bulgaria and enables an analysis of the heretofore unexplored Bulgarian wage
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1993 is then decomposed using the Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce [1991] technique to
identify the degree to which each factor contributed to women’s wage gains.
Bulgarian women’s gains in the early transition are related to both changes in
the relative returns to skill and changes in the composition of demand for goods and
services as the country moved toward a market economy. Women began the transi-
tion with as many years of education as men, but were more likely than men to have
obtained more general secondary and university degrees—degrees that, in contrast
to technical or vocational degrees, are experiencing increased remuneration in the
transition. Because more women have had an asset that has become more valuable,
they have improved their relative position. Furthermore, labor demand increased the
most in industries with more female workers while it fell among those industries
dominated by male workers. Although men began to enter commerce and services,
women continued to dominate these growing areas in the early transition, which in-
creased their relative earnings.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
During the year following the fall of President Todor Zhivkov1 in November 1989,
which marked the formal end of central planning, Bulgaria’s budget deficit grew, the
money supply remained unconstrained, and average nominal wages grew by 173 per-
cent [Enev and Koford, 1997, 86]. In early 1991 a package of fiscal and monetary
policies was introduced in the Polish-style “big bang shock therapy” to open and sta-
bilize the economy [World Bank, 1996, 23]. In February of that year, wages were
decentralized and the prices of 90 percent of goods were liberalized.2 These liberaliza-
tion and stabilization programs were introduced under extremely unfavorable condi-
tions. The Bulgarian economy depended heavily on Council of Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CMEA) markets and was, consequently, heavily penalized by their collapse.
(In 1991, GDP declined by 16 percent.) Not only were trade relations with the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) halted, the UN embargo against the former
Yugoslavia limited Bulgaria’s access to Western European markets. The Gulf crisis
worsened the situation as Iraq’s debt was Bulgaria’s biggest outstanding foreign loan
[Beleva, et al., 1994, 31].
An ideology of equality coupled with a system of centralized wage setting limited
the level of earnings inequality during central planning. To limit any negative social
consequences of wage and price liberalization, several new institutions developed in
the early transition to limit increases in earnings inequality. These included a tax-
based incomes policy, a minimum wage, and collective bargaining at the national,
regional, and enterprise levels.
A tax-based incomes policy was introduced after price liberalization in 1991 on
behalf of a tripartite agreement among government, employers and the largest na-
tional trade union federation.3 Beginning in the second quarter of 1991, direct con-
trols on wages were applied [Tzanov and Vaughan-Whitehead, 1997,100]. Based on
actual and expected inflation, the controls imposed a ceiling on the nominal wage bill
of individual enterprises to limit wage growth. The government planned to enforce
the policy by levying a highly progressive tax against excessive wage increases.4 In
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In addition to the incomes policy, public employee wages were controlled through
the maintenance of a universal minimum wage for all full-time workers. Under trade
union pressure, the state increased the minimum wage in 1990 from 180 to 191 Leva
per month. In 1992, the minimum wage increased to 850 Leva per month (equivalent
to $30). Although it was adjusted irregularly, the real value of the minimum wage did
not keep up with inflation [Tzanov and Vaughan-Whitehead, 1997, 100-101]. The real
value of the minimum wage based on 1989 Leva fell from 180 in 1989 to 71.3 Leva per
month in 1993.
Collective bargaining over wages was forbidden in Bulgaria during the first years
of the Communist period (from the 1940s to 1951) while non-wage issues were nego-
tiable. During the early transition (between 1989 and 1993) a pluralist system of
industrial relations developed within the context of continuous political upheaval.5
Trade unions and employers began to distance themselves from the State and the
Communist Party [Thirkell and Tseneva, 1992] and union activities were no longer
subordinated to the economic goals of the state [Iankova, 2000]. By 1993 four levels of
negotiation were present in Bulgaria [Iankova, 2000]. These included national tripar-
tite negotiations between the government, the national trade union organizations,
and the national organizations of employers, industry and sector level negotiations,
regional/local negotiations, and bargaining at the enterprise level including repre-
sentatives of the state, union, and employer organizations. By July of 1991, 37 per-
cent of state enterprises had negotiated collective bargaining agreements, and by
November of that year about 74 percent of the wage-earners were covered by collec-
tive agreements.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this analysis to decompose the change in the gender
earnings differentials over time is based on the decomposition developed by Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce [1991] in their analysis of black-white wage convergence in the
United States. The Juhn et al. methodology begins by estimating a male earnings
equation for male worker i in time t
(1) Yit = Xitt + tit + uit
where Xit is a vector containing the observable characteristics of an individual male
worker and t gives the coefficients on these characteristics in year t; it is assumed
that E(uit|xit) = 0, so that this equation gives mean earnings for males with given
characteristics. t is the standard deviation of the residual of the male earnings func-
tion in year t, and it = uit/mt  is a “standardized” residual of the male regression (with
mean zero and variance one).6 Changes in t through time reflect changes in within-
group inequality.
The actual earnings differential between males and females is:
Yt = Ymt – Yft = (Xmtmt + mtmt) – (Xftft + ftft).484 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Because female earnings regressions are based on male regression coefficients
(and male earnings residuals), it can be assumed that bmt = bft, such that the earnings
differential can then be written as:
(2) Yt = Ymt – Yft = (Xmt – Xft)mt + mt(mt  ft)
= Xtmt + mtt ,
where Xt = (Xmt – Xft) is the wage difference between men and women for the average
of the individual observable characteristics, the term Xtt is the predicted wage gap
between females and males in time t. t = (mt  ft) is the difference in the average
standardized wage residual for males and females in time t. ft  =  (Yft  Xftmt)/ mt
where (Yft  Xftmt) is the difference between a woman’s actual earnings and the earn-
ings that she would have received had she been rewarded for her characteristics at
the same rate as men. If there were no difference in returns between men and women
(mt = ft), the difference would have a mean of zero.
Typically, this value is negative, implying that on average women with the same
characteristics as men earn less. This difference is then divided by the standard de-
viation of the residual of the male earnings function in time t, mt. This standardiza-
tion yields the number of male residual standard deviations below zero that the aver-
age woman is paid. The term mtt then can be interpreted as women’s relative posi-
tion in the male residual earnings distribution at a given level of residual male earn-
ings inequality in time t.
Using this formulation, earnings convergence between males and females between
one year, such as year t, and another year, such as year s, can be written as:
(3) Ys – Yt = (Xs  Xt) mt + Xs (ms  mt) +  (s – t) mt + s (ms  mt)
This decomposes the earnings convergence into four components of observable
and unobservable characteristics. The first term in equation (3) is the portion of the
change in the earnings gap due to differences in measured characteristics such as
years of schooling and experience, or industry, evaluated at fixed male prices, (Xs 
Xt) mt. Blau and Kahn [1999] refer to this term as the “Measured Characteristics
Effect.” The second term measures the amount of the change in the earnings differen-
tial over time that is attributable to changes in the prices paid to men for of those
measured characteristics, or the male returns to education, experience, and industry,
Xs (ms  mt). Blau and Kahn [ibid.] refer to this term as the “Measured Prices
Effect.” The third term denotes changes in women’s relative position in the male re-
sidual earnings distribution—that is, whether females are moving up or down in the
distribution of male earnings residuals over time, (s – t) mt. Blau and Kahn [ibid.]
refer to this term as the “Gap Effect.” The last term reflects differences in residual
inequality over time, or the difference in the “penalty” placed on being at a lower
position in the earnings distribution, s (ms  mt). Blau and Kahn [ibid.] refer to
this term as the “Unmeasured Price Effect.” Provided that the t term is negative
(that women earn less than men on average), the fourth term indicates that an in-485 CHANGES IN GENDER EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS
crease in inequality would increase the male-female earnings differential even if women
maintained the same relative position in the male distribution, s – t = 0.7
The sum of the first and third terms is a reflection of the gender-specific factors
that contribute to the difference in earnings. Gender differences in qualifications and
gender differences in earnings rank at a given level of measured characteristics. The
sum of the second and fourth terms is a reflection of the labor market structure. The
wage-structure effect measures the impact of cross-time differences in returns to
measured and unmeasured characteristics. The sum of the third and fourth terms
represents the impact of cross-time differences in the “unexplained” differential in
traditional decompositions.8
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION
This analysis is based on two cross-sectional household surveys conducted in Bul-
garia, one administered prior to the transition and the other after the initial eco-
nomic reforms were in place. The 1986 Town and Village Survey, conducted by the
Institute of Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofia, was carried out
in conjunction with the national census delivered in the winter of 1985 and contains
heretofore unexplored information on the structure of Bulgarian wages prior to the
transition. The sample is random and representative of the population. After elimi-
nating those who reported zero earnings,9 the sample of employed civilians contains
6,545 cases.
The second survey, Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989: General
Population Survey (SSEE),10 was conducted in 1993 by a team of investigators from
University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA) in conjunction with Bulgarian officials
from the Central Statistical office. The field research took place between June and
July of 1993, during which time 4,921 interviews were completed. The empirical analy-
sis is restricted to employed civilians of working age and contains 2,828 cases. Those
working in agriculture and self-employed individuals are included in this analysis.
Monthly earnings were not adjusted for hours spent in the labor market in either the
1986 or the 1993 analysis.11, 12  A Heckman [1976; 1980] test for selection bias problem
found no bias in the sample.
Changes in the gender earnings differentials during the early years of Bulgaria’s
transformation from a planned economy to a mixed-market economy are reported in
Table 1. According to the table, the log gender earnings gap decreased over that time
period from 0.2921 to 0.2053, or a decrease of 0.0867 log points. This evidence indi-
cates that the log gender earnings differential decreased by over 29 percent over the
period.
The pattern of changes in gender earnings differentials across transitioning coun-
tries reported in the literature is inconsistent, as are the explanations for the changes.
Several authors report a decline in female wages relative to male wages in early-
transition Russia between 1991 and 1993 [Brainerd, 1998; Glinskaya and Mroz, 2000;
Newell and Reilly, 1998]. Also examining early-transition Russia, Ogloblin [1999]
attributed the gender wage gap to occupational segregation. Hunt [1998] found a
decline in the gender wage gap in unified Germany between 1990 and 1994. She486 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
attributed this to a fall in female employment rather than an improvement in women’s
economic well-being. Orazem and Vodopivec [2000] found that relative wages for
women rose in both Estonia and Slovenia. The authors attributed women’s relative
improvement to increased returns to human capital and shifts in industrial demand
that favored female-dominated industries.
Explaining the Fall in the Gender Earnings Gap
“Group-Specific” Factors. Economists traditionally approach the question of
wage differentials between men and women by focusing on the role of differences in
qualifications between gender groups, occupational or industrial segregation, or on
differences in the treatment of similarly qualified individuals (discrimination). Dif-
ferences in human capital accumulation or occupation between groups can be re-
ferred to as group-specific factors—where groups are based on gender, race, or
ethnicity—that influence wage differentials [Blau and Kahn, 1999].13 The following
discussion explores changes in such group-specific factors over time to explain the fall
in the gender earnings gap.
Table 2 presents changes in education and labor market experience among men
and women between 1986 and 1993. The information in this table indicates that the
men and women obtained nearly the same number of years of schooling in 1986 with
women obtaining slightly more on average by 1993 (11.24 years versus 10.96 years).
Women also began to close the gap in labor market experience in the early transition
(from a difference of 12 percent in 1986 to 4 percent in 1993). This evidence points to
a decline in the gender earnings gap, indicating that group-specific effects play a
strong role in the decline in the gender earnings differential.
Educational differences between men and women become more striking after
breaking the variable down into categories representing degrees completed by indi-
viduals. In both years men were much more likely than women to receive primary,
technical, and vocational degrees. Women, in contrast, were more likely in both years
to obtain a general secondary or university-level education. Nearly 14 percent of women
versus nearly 12 percent of men obtained a university degree in 1986, suggesting that
real differences existed between men and women in terms of the kind of degrees they
TABLE 1
Changes in Log Gender Earnings Differentials
Bulgaria 1986 and 1993a
Log of Male Log of Female Gender
Earnings  Earnings Gap
1986 5.4327 5.1407 0.2921
1993 7.7198 7.5145 0.2053
Gap93 – Gap86 -0.0867
a. Data is from a sample of the employed. Log wages are reported in nominal terms and reflect the
massive realignment of prices in the transition.
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have completed. Literature from other ECE countries documents similar differences
between men and women in the kind of degrees they obtained during communism. In
Poland, for example, female students from all economic backgrounds and from both
rural and urban areas avoided technical fields and specialized vocational studies,
opting for post-secondary programs such as teaching, nursing, and university educa-
tion leading to what some have termed the “feminization of higher education” [Bialecki
and Heyns, 1993, 116]. Studies from Poland [Bialecki and Heyns, 1993], Estonia and
Slovenia [Orazem and Vodopivec, 2000] find that differences in the educational de-
grees obtained by men and women benefited women in the transition.
In addition to education and experience, systematic differences between men and
women in industry participation may explain some of the narrowing of the gender
earnings gap. Table 3 presents the distribution of men and women in the labor mar-
ket as well as the change in employment in each industry. This table indicates that
employment grew most rapidly in the commerce and service industries. In contrast,
overall employment declined in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, public ad-
ministration, and communications in the early transition. In absolute terms women
continued to be more likely than men to be employed in the growth industries in both
1986 and 1993. Bialecki and Heyns [1993, 116] argue that women’s over-representa-
tion in white-collar industries during communism and in the early transition was a
direct consequence of the educational policies that promoted vocational and technical
education and, ultimately, working-class males. In terms of employment trends, men
entered the growth industries at a faster rate than women indicating that men may
overtake women in the growth industries.
“Wage-Structure” Factors. In addition to group-specific factors, labor market
institutions associated with the overall wage structure in an economy can play an
important role in generating wage differentials [Blau and Kahn, 1999]. “Wage-struc-
ture” factors refer to how different characteristics (such as schooling, experience, or
TABLE 2
Pre- and Early-Transition Educational Distribution of
Males and Females in the Labor Market
Bulgaria 1986 and 1993
All Males Females
% Change 1986 1993 %Change 1986 1993 %Change
Years of Schooling 0.092 10.12 10.96 0.083 10.20 11.24 0.102
Incomplete Primary 0.199 0.06 0.08 0.333 0.07 0.08 0.143
Complete Primary 0.384 0.35 0.23 0.343 0.31 0.17 0.452
Secondary Technical 0.294 0.23 0.31 0.348 0.22 0.27 0.227
Secondary Vocational 0.626 0.17 0.06 0.647 0.10 0.04 0.600
Secondary General 1.376 0.07 0.21 2.00 0.14 0.30 1.1429
University 0.042 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00
Experience 0.283 17.37 21.49 0.237 15.47 20.66 0.335
N 3,220 1,396 3,245 1,432
Columns may not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. Results are based on a sample of the employed.
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industry) are rewarded in an economy as well as changes in the overall level of in-
equality in an economy. Table 4 presents the results of an extended log earnings
function that controls for demographic factors such as marital status and living in the
capital city, Sofia, as well as sector (private, state or cooperative) and one-digit indus-
try codes of employment. Industry or occupational dummies could be endogenous and
could be correlated with the error terms of earnings equations. Regressions both with
and without industry controls are estimated in this paper and the results of the de-
composition are similar.
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that, as expected, the returns to general
secondary education and university education increased for both men and women in
the early transition. In contrast, returns to vocational degrees became negative for
both men and women by 1993, and returns to technical degrees fell for women. The
returns to a technical degree increased, but to a much smaller extent,  for men. In
absolute terms, the returns to university education were much higher among women
at nearly 43 percent in 1993 compared to men at 36 percent. This indicates that women
with university degrees gained more than men at the same educational level. The
trends in returns to higher degrees, however, favor men. The returns to general sec-
ondary education for men increased by nearly 10 percent while the returns to univer-
sity education increased by nearly 12 percent. Among women, general secondary re-
turns increased by only 8.4 percent and university returns increased by 7 percent.
Changes in the returns to working in particular industries were also similar for
men and women. Both gender groups experienced the largest increases in returns in
the commerce and service industries. Men’s returns to commerce increased by over
25 percent compared to 11 percent for women. In services, men’s returns increased by
nearly 10 percent as compared to women’s 14 percent.
Changes in the overall level of inequality in an economy can also affect earnings
differentials between men and women. An absolute increase in inequality can penal-
TABLE 3
Pre- and Early-Transition Industry Distribution of
Males and Females in the Labor Market
Bulgaria 1986 and 1993a
% Female All Males % Females %
1986 1993 Change 1986 1993 Change 1986 1993 Change
Manufacturing 51.13 50.00 0.1578 0.3419 0.2973 0.1306 0.3550 0.2898 0.1837
Construction 21.47 23.91 0.1398 0.1193 0.1003 0.1591 0.0324 0.0307 0.0504
Agriculture 44.77 46.93 0.0684 0.1919 0.1734 0.0968 0.1544 0.1494 0.0321
Commerce 66.52 55.16 0.8289 0.0478 0.1182 1.4714 0.0943 0.1418 0.5033
Services 67.65 56.50 0.4074 0.0578 0.1103 0.9098 0.1199 0.1397 0.1651
Public Administration 44.67 60.78 0.4082 0.0677 0.0287 0.5768 0.0542 0.0433 0.2017
Transportation 23.34 33.91 0.2919 0.0969 0.1089 0.1237 0.0293 0.0545 0.8606
Communications 69.73 71.05 0.0609 0.0696 0.0630 0.0938 0.1590 0.1508 0.0514
N 3,220 1,396 3,245 1,432
a. Columns may not sum to 1.0 due to rounding; the industry groups refer to 1digit industry codes; data
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TABLE 4
Log Earnings Functions
Bulgaria 1986 and 1993
Male Female MaleFemale
Change Change Difference
1986 1993 (B93 – B86) 1986 1993 (B93 – B86) 1993
constant 5.1650 7.4265 4.8474 7.2489
priminc 0.1562 0.0665 0.0897 0.0679 0.0464 0.0215 0.0201
(5.39) (1.59) (2.75) (1.15)
techcomp 0.0739 0.0815 0.0076 0.1306 0.1083 0.0223 0.0268
(5.20) (2.37) (9.80) (3.34)
voccomp 0.0435 0.0271 0.0707 0.0817 0.0020 0.0837 0.0252
(2.67) (0.55) (4.48) (0.04)
gencomp 0.0404 0.1394 0.0990 0.0490 0.1327 0.0837 0.0067
(1.96) (3.69) (3.01) (4.31)
unicomp 0.2391 0.3569 0.1178 0.3561 0.4265 0.0704 0.0696
(12.69) (7.75) (21.27) (10.93)
ex 0.0230 0.0107 0.0124 0.0271 0.0120 0.0152 0.0013
(11.95) (2.95) (12.85) (4.42)
exsq 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000
(8.81) (3.03) (9.00) (4.26)
nonbulg 0.0394 0.0629 0.0235 0.0368 0.0303 0.0065 0.0326
(2.29) (2.13) (2.16) (0.87)
married 0.0573 0.0354 0.0218 0.0310 0.0180 0.0130 0.0535
(3.78) (1.09) (2.17) (0.71)
sofia 0.0712 0.1515 0.0804 0.0295 0.1138 0.0843 0.0377
(4.21) (4.29) (1.95) (4.26)
state 0.0324 0.0994 0.0670 0.0570 0.0286 0.0284 0.0708
(1.60) (2.46) (2.90) (0.80)
private 0.0253 0.2818 0.2565 0.2262 0.1827 0.0435 0.0991
(0.14) (5.57) (0.89) (3.41)
const 0.0301 0.0524 0.0223 0.0159 0.0056 0.0215 0.0580
(1.85) (1.17) (0.70) (0.09)
ag 0.1462 0.1051 0.0411 0.0519 0.0344 0.0175 0.0707
(7.33) (2.71) (2.44) (0.97)
comrce 0.2482 0.0031 0.2513 0.1441 0.0355 0.1086 0.0386
(10.61) (0.06) (8.64) (0.98)
svcs 0.2030 0.1063 0.0967 0.1487 0.0056 0.1431 0.1007
(9.90) (2.51) (9.88) (0.17)
pubadmin 0.0357 0.0911 0.1268 0.0306 0.0324 0.0018 0.0587
(1.56) (1.26) (1.48) (0.65)
trans 0.0722 0.0468 0.0254 0.0597 0.0484 0.1082 0.0952
(3.84) (1.17) (2.17) (1.08)
Communi 0.2505 0.1905 0.0599 0.1442 0.0559 0.0883 0.1346
(11.81) (4.11) (9.79) (1.821)
R2 0.2247 0.1671 0.1808
F-test 49.02 13.33 15.32
N 3,220 1,396 1,432
T-statistics are in parentheses; log of monthly earnings is dependent variable; primary education, coop-
erative employment and manufacturing are benchmarks. Results are based on a sample of the employed.
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ize the low-end of the earnings distribution even if the relative level of inequality goes
unchanged (or even improves). Congruent with evidence that inequality increased in
Bulgaria’s early transition [Rutkowski, 1996; Beleva, Jackman, and Nenova-Amar,
1995], Table 5 presents evidence of a widening distribution of wages in Bulgaria in
the early transition. The ratio of average top-decile to bottom-decile earnings for both
1986 and 1993 are presented, as are percentage changes in the ratio by gender, edu-
cation, and industry. Earnings differences between the very rich and the very poor in
Bulgaria grew between 1986 and 1993.
In summary, both group-specific factors and wage-structure factors may have
contributed to the decreased earnings gap between men and women in Bulgaria’s
early transition. In terms of group-specific factors, women obtained as much or more
years of schooling as men and obtained higher degrees that were rewarded in the
transition. Laporte and Ringold [1997] argue that those obtaining more generalized
and higher education have greater flexibility in the uncertain transition and com-
mand higher wages. While applied vocational training and technical skills were es-
sential to the development of heavy industry during central planning [Bialecki and
Heyns, 1993], more generalized and higher-level education is better suited to the new
market economy. Women were also over-represented in growing industries such as
commerce and services, although men are moving into these industries at a faster
rate.
Changing returns to education and industry also served to improve the relative
economic position of women in the early transition. The returns to higher education
TABLE 5
Changes in the Wage Structure: Ratios of Top Decile Earnings to
Bottom Decile Earnings by Gender, Education, and Industry
Ratio of Top Decile to Bottom Decile
1986 1993 % change
All 3.296 5.341 0.620
Men 3.491 5.524 0.582
Women 3.090 4.958 0.605
Primary Incomplete 3.538 5.651 0.597
Primary Complete 3.223 4.207 0.305
Technical Complete 3.254 5.303 0.630
Vocational Complete 3.326 5.475 0.646
General Complete 3.150 5.463 0.734
University Complete 3.139 4.343 0.384
Manufacturing 3.092 5.326 0.723
Construction 3.662 5.363 0.464
Agriculture 3.246 4.955 0.526
Commerce 3.184 5.535 0.738
Services 3.445 6.053 0.757
Public Administration 2.871 6.028 1.100
Transportation 3.287 5.006 0.523
Communication 3.274 5.199 0.588
Data is from a sample of the employed. Source: author’s calculations.491 CHANGES IN GENDER EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS
as well as the female-dominated commerce and service industries increased for both
men and women. In contrast to these positive trends, increased inequality between
the rich and the poor penalized those in the low end of the wage distribution, who
were more likely to be women than men. To determine the degree to which each
factor explains the decrease in the gender earnings gap, it is necessary to decompose
the changes in the earnings gap. It is expected that the changing returns to the edu-
cational degree obtained and to employment in particular industries that favored
women in the early transition will explain the bulk of the decrease in the gender
earnings gap.
RESULTS
The earnings decomposition for the “Basic”, “Extended” and “Full” models are
presented in Table 6. To explain these changes, the differential is broken down into
four separate effects: the observed characteristics effect, the observed price effect, the
gap effect, and the unmeasured prices effect. Group-specific factors consist of the
“observed characteristics effect” plus the “gap effect.” Wage-structure factors consist
of the “observed price effect” plus the “unmeasured prices effect.”
From the descriptive information provided in the previous sections, it is hypoth-
esized that differences in the educational degree obtained as well as differences in the
rate at which men and women entered growing industries in the early transition
contributed to the decrease in the earnings gap between men and women. The por-
tion of the gap explained by these factors is captured in two parts of the decomposi-
tion. The first is within the “observed characteristic effects.” These results show the
effect of changes in the level of education obtained over time and employment in a
particular industry. The second is within the “observed price effect,” which shows the
effect of changes in the returns to different levels of education and to employment in
different industries on the gender earnings gap.
Group-Specific And Wage-Structure Factors
Focusing on the “full model” in Table 6, three of the four components of the Juhn
et al. decomposition are negative, contributing to a decline in the gender earnings
gap.14 The “observed characteristics effect,” the “observed prices effect,” and the “gap
effect” served to diminish earnings differences between men and women. A negative
“observed characteristics effect” indicates that changes in the differences between
men and women in observable characteristics such as the number of years of school-
ing or the industry in which men or women tend to participate served to diminish the
gender earnings gap. In other words, additional years of schooling, for example, ben-
efited women and improved their relative earnings. Similarly, a negative “observed
prices effect” indicates that changes in returns to these characteristics benefited women
over men, diminishing the gender earnings gap. A negative “gap effect” signifies
women’s movement up the distribution of male earnings—an indication of their im-
provement in terms of relative earnings.
The last components “unobserved prices effect” served to increase the gender earn-
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Log Wages
Bulgaria 19861993
Basic Extended Full
  Observed Characteristics Effect (Xs) 0.0132 (8.96) 0.0070 (0.56) 0.0139 (0.49)
Years of Schooling 0.0061 (8.15)
Primary Incomplete 0.0014 (4.67) 0.0012 (3.73)
Secondary Technical Complete    0.0042 (2.99)    0.0030 (2.15)
Secondary Vocational Complete 0.0037 (1.32) 0.0024 (0.89)
Secondary General Complete 0.0012 (1.86) 0.0007 (1.07)
University Complete    0.0015 (5.36)    0.0015 (5.19)
Experience 0.0257 (6.89) 0.0253 (6.52) 0.0248 (6.38)
Experience Squared    0.0186 (6.08)    0.0189 (6.18)    0.0186 (5.97)
Nonbulg 0.0011 (1.34)
Married    0.0040 (1.76)
Sofia    0.0004 (2.02)
State 0.0025 (0.80)
Private    0.0015 (0.50)
Construction    0.0005 (0.67)
Agriculture    0.0020 (3.78)
Commerce 0.0057 (5.07)
Services 0.0067 (4.80)
Public Administration 0.0010 (0.49)
Transportation    0.0010 (1.80)
     Communication 0.0004 (5.40)
Observed Prices Effect 0.0039 (0.03) 0.0164 (0.13) 0.0169 (0.12)
     Years of Schooling 0.0025 (4.10)
Primary Incomplete 0.0007 (1.58) 0.0007 (1.69)
Secondary Technical Complete    0.0005 (8.30)    0.0003 (5.41)
Secondary Vocational Complete 0.0021 (1.03) 0.0014 (0.73)
Secondary General Complete 0.0099 (5.28) 0.0092 (4.91)
University Complete 0.0031 (4.84) 0.0022 (3.40)
Experience 0.0126 (0.89) 0.0110 (0.76) 0.0102 (0.71)





Private    0.0167 (57.55)
Construction 0.0016 (0.71)
Agriculture    0.0010 (1.06)
Commerce 0.0059 (4.65)
Services 0.0028 (1.79)
Public Administration    0.0019 (4.36)
Transportation    0.0014 (0.83)
Communication 0.0053 (2.22)
Gap Effect 0.1390 (5.95) 0.1340 (5.81) 0.1220 (6.65)
Unobserved Price Effect    0.0693 (11.25)    0.0705 (11.46)    0.0660 (22.00)
Total Change in Gap (19931986) 0.0867 0.0867 0.0867
Sum of GroupSpecific Effects 0.1520 0.1410 0.1360
Sum of Wage Structure Effects    0.0654    0.0541    0.0491
Sum of Unobserved Effects 0.0696 0.0633 0.0559
The regression includes controls for education, experience and its square, living in the capital city, mari-
tal status, sector of the economy, and industry. T-statistics are in parentheses.The computation of the
standard errors follows Gill and Leigh [2000] and Brown and Corcoran [1997]. Source: Author’s calcula-
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Changes in the overall level of inequality in the economy penalized those at the low
end of the earnings distribution, and women tend to be at the low end of the earnings
distribution. Changes in “group-specific factors” helped women whereas changes in
“wage-structure factors” hurt women. On net, however, the group-specific factors
outweighed the negative wage-structure effect, resulting in an improvement in women’s
relative earnings. Further, none of the remaining difference between male and fe-
male earnings is explained by what is sometimes referred to as “discrimination” (the
gap effect plus the unobserved prices effect).
Observed Characteristics. Looking first at the “observed characteristics” cat-
egory, Table 6 illustrates that the impact of measured characteristics is negative for
all three models, indicating that the women in 1993 have relatively favorable levels of
schooling, experience, and industry of employment as compared to 1986. Women ex-
perienced a relative gain in observable characteristics contributing to a decline in the
gender earnings gap over the period by 0.0132, 0.0070, and 0.0139 log points in each
model respectively.
Disaggregating the “observed characteristics” effect into its component parts in
the “full model” shows that the educational degree obtained and industry of employ-
ment contributed to the decline in the earnings gap, particularly for wage differences
between men and women in vocational and general secondary education. These two
factors constitute approximately 22 percent of the “observed characteristics effect”
(0.0031/0.0139). Similarly, differences between men and women in industry employ-
ment also served to diminish the gender earnings differential. In particular, partici-
pation in commerce, services, public administration, and communication contributed
to a decline in the gap.
Observed Prices. Like the “observed characteristics effect”, the “observed prices
effect” served to decrease the gender earnings differential in each model by 0.0039,
0.0164, and 0.0169 log points respectively. This indicates that rising returns to school-
ing, sector of the economy, and industry, for example, favored women over men in the
transition.
Focusing on the “full” model and breaking down the “observed prices” effect into
its component parts, changing returns to all secondary and university-level degrees
contributed to a decline in the gender earnings differential in the transition. The
higher-education components consist of 0.0128 log points, translating into over 75
percent of the observed prices effect (0.0128/0.0169).
Changes in returns to the previously identified “growth” industries (commerce
and services) also contribute to a fall in the gender earnings differential in Bulgaria’s
early transition. These two industries alone comprise 0.0087 log points, translating
into over 51 percent of the observed prices effect (0.0087/0.0169).  This indicates that
in the transition, rising returns to commerce and services favored women over men.
One interpretation is that the large observed price effect (particularly in the “full
model”) is due to the persistent high level of industry segregation by gender. The
observed price effect may reflect discrimination if segregation by industry ‘crowds’
women into certain industries in the economy, thereby decreasing earnings [Bergmann,
1974]. In this case, industry segregation benefited women. As of 1993, women contin-
ued to be disproportionately represented in commerce and services and as a result,
they benefited from the growth in these industries.494 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 The Gap Effect. The “gap effect” measures the contributions of women’s place-
ment each year in the male residual wage distribution to the change in the ethnic
wage differential between 1986 and 1993. This effect decreased the gender pay gap by
0.1220 log points in the “full model.” This effect indicates that women moved up in the
male residual earnings distribution.
Unmeasured Prices. The “unmeasured prices” effect served to exacerbate the
gender earnings gap over time in all three models by 0.0693, 0.0705, and 0.0660 log
points respectively. This factor indicates that the increase in overall inequality in the
Bulgarian earnings distribution in the early transition hurt women and limited their
gains made from improved characteristics and returns to those characteristics.
In summary, group-specific components (observed characteristics plus the gap
effect) in the “full” model reduced the gender earnings gap by the largest amount,
0.1360 log points, while wage-structure factors (observed prices plus unobserved prices)
increased the gap by 0.0491 log points. Assuming that price changes in the transition
affected men and women similarly, rising inequality in the transition reclaimed some
of the gains women made but the gains in terms of improved characteristics and
prices in the transition were large enough to cause the gender earnings gap to de-
crease.
CONCLUSIONS
In the face of increased earnings inequality in the transition, women were able to
“swim upstream” by improving their education and employment situation in terms of
both observed characteristics and observed prices.15 By 1993, women obtained as many
or more years of education than men. More importantly though, they tended to obtain
more general secondary degrees and university degrees than men. With more of an
asset that was better rewarded in the early transition, women improved their rela-
tive earnings. Similarly, although men were moving into commerce and services, by
1993 women continued to be disproportionately represented in these growing indus-
tries and enjoyed a relative growth in earnings. At the low end of the earnings distri-
bution, women were penalized by the increase in overall economic inequality by 1993.
On net, however, the gains they had made outweighed the losses from increased in-
equality.
Further research is needed in several dimensions to gain a better understanding
of the effects of the transition on gender inequality. First, because this study covered
only the early years of Bulgaria’s transition, one cannot extrapolate the effect of the
transition to women’s relative economic position more generally. Studies on later years
in the transition would shed light on the long-term effects. Second, a more detailed
study on differences in education obtained by men and women would enhance these
preliminary findings. Third, more detailed occupational data as well as information
on skilled versus unskilled labor and managerial status would illuminate the degree
to which women in Bulgaria (and ECE more generally) faced both horizontal and
vertical segregation in industries and occupations and whether or not such segrega-
tion contributed to gender inequality in the transition.495 CHANGES IN GENDER EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS
NOTES
The author would like to thank Mieke Meurs, Steve Pressman, Bob Lerman and Taggert Brooks for
their comments as well as suggestions made by two anonymous reviewers.
1. President Todor Zhivkov was the longtime communist leader of Bulgaria.
2. The government continued to monitor prices of fourteen essential commodities, four goods were
priced by the state, and a special policy was introduced to control energy prices [Pishev, 1992].
3. For a detailed description of the wage determination and wage policy in Bulgaria during the period
1990-1993, see ILO-CEET and EC [1994] and Bankov [1994].
4. The tax on excess wage fund increases between February and June of 1991 was determined by the
following scheme: If the increase was < 1 percent above the fund, a 100 percent marginal tax rate was
placed on the increment; if between 1 and 2 percent the marginal tax rate was 200 percent; if be-
tween 2 and 3 percent the tax was 400 percent; and if above 3 percent, the marginal tax rate was 800
percent.
5. Between November of 1989 and December of 1991 alone, the country saw four changes in govern-
ment.
6. There will be a difference between the male and the female standardized residuals (mt and ft) be-
cause, though the female regression is based on male coefficients, it relies on female characteristics.
7. Although this decomposition breaks down the residual factors into two components, as opposed to
the Blinder [1973] or Oaxaca [1973] techniques, the components still represent that portion of the
difference in earnings that cannot be explained by the explanatory variables in the wage equation. In
other words, regardless of the fact that the residual is decomposed, it is still a residual, and it is still
a measure of our ignorance and dependant on the structure of the regression equation.
8. Like other decomposition techniques, the Juhn, Pierce and Murphy technique is subject to the famil-
iar index problem. The year that one chooses as a base may alter the specific values obtained for each
of the four components of the decomposition. For example, in this decomposition, I use 1986 as the
base year and examine changes in the gender earnings differentials that occur by 1993 as opposed to
using 1993 as the base year. Regardless of what base year is used, the overall results are robust.
Similarly, whether or not one chooses to base the decomposition on a female earnings equation
versus a male earnings equation will also affect the specific results. Following other studies, this
formulation bases the decomposition on the male regression because it is expected that over time,
discrimination against women will affect male regression coefficients to a lesser extent. These esti-
mates form the basis for the estimate of the observed price effect and doing so will limit any distor-
tions that could occur from discrimination (See also Blau and Kahn [1999]).
9. Twenty-two respondents reported zero earnings in the sample of the employed.
10. The Bulgarian survey is part of a larger multi-country comparative research project including five
other Central and East European countries.
11. The number of hours worked was only available in the 1993 survey; however, it is a reasonable
assumption that all employed individuals during Communism worked full-time. Normal working
hours per week were generally longer in Central and Eastern than in Western European countries.
In particular, the average workweek in Bulgaria during Communism was approximately 40.5 for
both men and women [Kroupova, 1990, 10, quoted in Hubner, Maier, and Rudolph, 1991, 34]. Adjust-
ing for hours in the 1993 analysis made no significant difference in the results. The results of the
1993 analysis after adjusting for hours as well as a description of how the data were adjusted to
account for hours in the adjusted analysis are available from the author upon request.
12. Respondents in the SSEE survey were permitted to record incomes either as annual or as monthly.
The variable used in this analysis includes monthly incomes with imputed missing and implausible
values (implausible because they are values that could not realistically occur in Bulgaria given the
other characteristics of the respondent, and hence almost certainly constitute errors in reporting or
recording). The imputation was made by assigning expected values from a regression of each income
variable being imputed on a set of characteristics known to determine incomes and little distortion
was introduced. Cases that could not be imputed because data were missing for the independent
variables in the regression equations were assigned a value of 0 and dropped from the analysis.
13. Blau and Kahn refer to these factors as “gender-specific.” The more general term “group-specific” will
be used here instead.496 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
14. Note that a negative number indicates that the factor serves to decrease the gender earnings gap,
describing a relative improvement of the standing of women. A positive number indicates that the
factor serves to increase the gender earnings gap, contributing to a relative decline in standing for
women.
15. Metaphor from Blau and Kahn [1999].
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